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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
Plaintiff/Respondent,
vs.

CASE NO:

890297-CA

STATE OF CALIFORNIA and
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,

PRIORITY: 14b

Defendant/Appellant.
Appeal from an Order of the
Second Judicial District Court
Of Weber County
Judge Stanton M. Taylor
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The subject matter of this appeal is that of a domestic
relations Order relative to child

support and visitation.

Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant
to the Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (h) which states:
(2) The Court of Appeals has
appellate
jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals,
over:
(h) appeals from district court
involving domestic
relations cases,
including but not limited to divorce,
annulment, property
division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption
and paternity;...

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
In

1988

Blanca

H.

Charlesworth

and

the

State

of

California by and through the State of Utah petitioned the
District Court for the County of Weber, State of Utah, to
obtain

an

obligation

Charlesworth
forcement

pursuant

of

of

support

to the Utah

Support

Act,

against
Uniform

(hereinafter

Laurian

P.

Reciprocal Enreferred

to

as

URESA).
At a hearing before the Domestic Relations Commissioner
for Weber County, a payment of child support was determined
to be paid by Mr. Charlesworth

in the sum of $76.00 per

month per child, payable through the Weber County Clerk's
Office, but conditioned upon Mr. Charlesworth being able to
visit with the minor children.

An objection was filed by

Blanca H. Charlesworth and the State of California through
the Utah Attorney
recommendations

General's

and

the

Office

trial

to the

Judge,

Commissioner's

Stanton

M.

Taylor,

affirmed the recommendations of the Commissioner, ordering
Mr. Charlesworth
child

to pay the sum of $76.00 per month per

uO the Clerk of the Court with said sums to be re-

tained by the Clerk of the Court until such time as Mr.
Charlesworth was able to exercise visitation with the minor
children which benefit he had been denied of since the time
of the divorce filed by Mr. Charlesworth
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in the State of

Utah and finalized August 12, 1983.
by

the Trial

Court

of

With the reaffirmation

the Commissioner's

recommendation,

Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal to this forum.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the District Court abused its discretion

in an equity matter.
2.

Whether

the District

Court

has

jurisdiction

to

adjudicate visitation privileges in a proceeding under the
URESA when the original Decree was entered in the responding
state.
3.

Whether

terminated

the

payment

or withheld

as

of

child

a result

of

support
the

can

be

non-custodial

parent being unable to exercise his rights of visitation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 1. 19£3, the Respondent as Plaintiff filed
a Complaint
divorce.

in the District Court of Weber County

for a

Almost immediately or simultaneously, the Defen-

dant/Appellant

left

the

State

of

Utah

for

Santa Monica,

California, and the Respondent obtained service by publication of Summons.
Thereafter
Divorce

(See Trial Record pp. 1, 4 and 11)
the

on August

Flaintiff

12, 1983, by

was

awarded

a

the Honorable

Decree

of

Douglas L.

Cornaby, District Courr Judge, with an award of the minor
children of the parties to the Defendant subject to reason-

able visitation by the Plaintiff and a further Order in the
Decree that child support should be held in abeyance until
further order of the Court.

(See Trial Record pp. 13-23).

Thereafter on July 5, 1988, almost five years after the
entry

of

the

original

Decree

of

Divorce,

the

Defen-

dant/Appellant by and through the Assistant Attorney General
of

the

State

Enforcement
URESA),

of

filed

of

Utah

under

Support

Act

a Petition

Record p. 26-41).

the

Utah

Uniform

(hereinafter

for

child

Reciprocal

referred

support.

to

as

(See Trial

The Department of Social Services for the

State of Utah served the Petition for support and Order to
Show Cause upon the Plaintiff/Respondent under and pursuant
to the Utah URESA, Utah Code Annotated § 77-31-1, 1953 as
amended.
A

hearing

was

held

before

the

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner, Maurice Richards, on the 18th day of October,
1988, wherein the Commissioner recommended

that commencing

November, 1988, the Plaintiff/Respondent pay to the Defendant/Appellant

$76.00 per month per child

as and for the

three (3) minor children, but that the Weber County Clerk's
Office be directed

to hold the funds until the Defendant

allowed the Plaintiff visitation with the minor children,
which was entered November 14, 1988.
58 & 59)
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(See Trial Record pp.

Thereafter

on November

16, 1988, Defendant/Appellant

filed an objection to the Recommended Order on the grounds
that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to address anyother issues other than child support since it was a URESA
action and requested a hearing in front of a Judge.
Trial Record pp. 60-61).
December

12, 1988, with

their counsel.

(See

The objection hearing was heard on
argument

by

the

parties

through

The Trial Court affirmed the recommendations

of the Commissioner and reserved the ruling on the support
abatement, ordering the child support be held by the Clerk.
Plaintiff was

allowed

visitation

the day

after

Christmas

with counsel scheduling a future hearing date for a report
on the status of visitation arrangements.

(See Trial Record

p. 65) .
On March 13, 1989, a review was had on the visitation
and a possible release of child support monies, before the
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Judge Presiding, and evidence
was presented that the Plaintiff/Respondent was still unable
to contact the•Defendant for visitation and had not seen his
children since Appellantfs original leaving from the State
of Utah in February of 1983.
that

all

payments

tiff/Respondent
until

of

The Trial Court again ordered

support

made

by

the

Plain-

should remain with the Clerk of the Court

such time as the Plaintiff was able to contact the

Defendant and work out visitation with his three
children.

(3) minor

(See Trial Record pp. 73-74).

From this Order the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal
bringing this matter to the attention of this Court.

(See

Trial Record p. 75).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.
and more

The Appellate Court in reviewing matters in equity
specifically, in a divorce

from disturbing

action, will

refrain

the findings of the Trial Court unless a

clear abuse of discretion is shown.
2.

The Trial Court did not err in exercising juris-

diction over the issue cf visitation and child support as
that

had

already

been

conferred,

both

in

personam

and

subject matter jurisdiction from the previous divorce action
regardless of the pending URESA action.
3.

The retainage by the Trial Court with the Clerk of

the Court of a child support payment can be made contingent
upon an obligation by the custodial parent to allow free
exercise of visitation, especially

in view of a potenticn

contempt situation and failure to comply completely with the
URESA statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THIS COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS
OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE IS A
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CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A DIVORCE
PROCEEDING.
The
recently

standard

for

considered

by

reviewing
the Utah

matters
Supreme

in

equity

was

in J

& M

Court

Const., Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), wherein
the Court held as follows:
In reviewing matters m
equity,
this Court will reverse the trial court
only [emphasis added] when the evidence
clearly
preponderates
against
the
findings below. Although we may review
that
evidence, we
are
particularly
mindful of the advantaged position of
the trial court to hear, weigh, and
evaluate the testimony of the parties,
(cite omitted) Where the evidence may
be in conflict, this Court will not
upset the findings belcv; unless the
evidence
so
clearly
preponderates
against them that this Court is convinced that a manifest injustice has
been done...
The Court of Appeals of Utah in the recent decision of
Boyle

v.

Boyle,

735

P.2d

669

(Utah App.

1987)

follows:
This
Court
will
refrain
from
disturbing findings of the trial court
in a divorce action unless a clear abuse
of discretion is shown.
(cite omitted)
The trial court is clearly in the best
position to weigh the evidence, determine creditabilty and arrive at factual
conclusions...
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
EXERCISING JURISDICTION WHICH IT PROPERLY H£D TO HEAR AND ADJUDICATE THE ISSUES
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held

as

INVOLVING VISITATION AND CHILD SUPPORT
REGARDLESS OF THE PENDING URESA ACTION.
The State of Utah in behalf of the State of California
has

argued

that

the

Weber

County

District

Court

lacks

jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate issues involving visitation

in a URESA

action.

In support of this premise and

argument, the Appellant cites this Court to several cases,
none of which are Utah cases so they are therefore persuasive and not binding case law.
A
would

careful and
indicate

thorough review of each

that their

facts

from the immediate case at hand.
581

P.2d

824

(Kan. App.

1978),

are very

of

the

cases

distinguishable

In Patterson v. Patterson,
a Decree

of Divorce was

entered in Texas where the Court ordered the father to pay
child support, granting custody to the mother and awarding
the

father

rights

of

visitation.

Thereafter

the

father

moved to Kansas and the mother initiated a URESA petition
seeking

enforcement

of

the

child

support

order

in

the

responding State of Kansas, or the state in which the father
presently was residing with the petitioner still residing in
the State of Texas or the original state of divorce.
Kansas

Court

conditioning

of Appeals
disbursement

did

reverse

the

Trial

Court

or payment of the child

The
in

support

upon the mother fulfilling the father!s visitation rights,
explaining that this order was beyond the jurisdiction of
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the State of Kansas, the state the father had moved to.

It

is true that nothing in the Act had allowed the adjudication
of child

custody, visitation privileges or other matters,

only determined in domestic relations cases.

The Patterson

case as well as all other cases cited by the Appellant is
distinguishable from the immediate case at hand because in
this case the Appellant who is the petitioning party was
divorced in this State and voluntarily moved to the State of
California during the time of the divorce, taking the minor
children with her, while the Respondent who is the obligor
has

remained

throughout
divorce

in

this

the

same

action,

county

having

in the State of Utah.

reasonable

rights

of visitation

in

the

originally

State

of

Utah

initiated

the

The Respondent did obtain
and

an

Order

that

child

support be held in abeyance until further order of the Utah
Court, which was signed on the 12th day of August, 1983.
Under the Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5, and particularly subsection (3), the Code authorizes this State to continue to adjudicate and determine matters of child support and
visitation, which states as follows:
(3) The
Court
has
continuing
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes
or new orders for the support and
maintenance of the parties, the custody
of zhe
children and their support,
maintenance, health, dental care, or
the distribution of the property as is
reasonable and necessary.
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Accordingly, under the Utah Code Annotated, the State
of Utah maintains jurisdiction on a continuing basis for any
subsequent

modification

or

enforcement

of

the

Decree

of

Divorce and its terms, including the enforcement of reasonable rights of visitation, which in this case were granted
by the Trial Court after proper

service of the Complaint

upon the Appellant.
The

Utah

subparagraph

Code

Annotated

(6) confers

§

78-27-24

"long-arm"

in

particular

jurisdiction over the

Appellant with service accomplished pursuant to Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which in this case was a
Summons done by publication.

Subsection

(6) of the Utah

Code Annotated § 78-27-24 reads as follows:
Any
person,
notwithstanding
§
16-10-102, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this state, who in person or
through an agent does any of the following enumerated acts, submits himself,...
to the jurisdiction of the courts of
this state as to any claim arising from:
(6) With respect to actions of
divorce , separate maintenance, child
support, having resided in, the marital
relationship, within this state, notwithstanding subsequent departure from
the state;...
The Appellant

in this divorce

action

took the minor

children of the parties from the State of Utah on the day of
or

subsequent

divorce

in

the

to

the

State

filing
of

by

Utah,

-10-

the
and

Respondent
fled

with

for

the

the minor

children to the State of California.
six

During that more than

(6) year time period, the Respondent has not had any

access, either telephonically or in person or by mail, with
the Appellant nor the parties1 minor children.

This fleeing

from the State of Utah did not deprive the State of Utah of
its "long-arm" jurisdiction, because the Utah Code Annotated
§ 78-27-24(6) indicates that since the parties resided in a
marital relationship within this State, notwithstanding any
subsequent

departure

from

this

State,

the

Appellant

is

subject to the jurisdiction of this State with respect to
actions of divorce, separate maintenance or child support.
Accordingly, because the State of Utah is the state of
original

jurisdiction

completed

and

wherein

an Order

the

or Decree

divorce

was

of Divorce

commenced,
having

been

entered regarding child support and child visitation, this
Court

has

matters

continuing

and

the

jurisdiction

Appellant

by

in

availing

regards
herself

to
of

those
this

action, even though through a State agency and through a
URESA petition, such action does not deprive this State of
its continuing jurisdiction to grant to the Respondent and
consider issues of contempt or failure to allow visitation.
Constitutionally the XIV Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, in particular Section 1, states:
any

...No state shall make or enforce
law
which
shall
abridge
the
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privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the protection of the laws.
Even

more

importantly,

the

Constitution

of

Utah,

Article 1, Section 7, states:
No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of lav/.
Under these facts, to deny the Respondent his full rights
under the Decree of Divorce without a full hearing on not
only the issue of modification for child support reasons,
but also whether or not there is contempt or a failure by
the Appellant to obey a Court Order such that she is availing herself of the laws of the State of Utah with ''unclean
hands" would be a denial of the Respondent's procedural due
process

rights, depriving

him

of

income

for

support

of

children that he has not seen since the original entry of
the Decree of Divorce in 1983.
In State ex rel. State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722
P.2d

48

(Or. App. 1986), as cited by

the Appellant, the

Oregon Court of Appeals determined that "interference with
visitation rights may not be raised in" a URESA petition.
In that case a proceeding for enforcement of child support
under URESA was

initiated

in the State of Washington and

transferred to the State of Oregon, and the State of Oregon
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refused to exercise jurisdiction for any purpose other than
the collection of child support.

Again, as in the previous

case cited by the Appellant and as distinguishable from this
case,

the

paren-

support resided
home

and

child

that were

seeking

the

child

in the State of Washington which was the

state of the Defendant child, and which state would

have subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction
to determine custody
Oregon where

the obligor

visitation

rights

involving

the

Washington.

and visitation and not the State of

was

resided.

not

dependent

a

Any

defense

child

whose

interference
to

the

home

with

proceeding
state

was

In this case a URESA action was brought to this

State, the original state of the divorce which has continuing jurisdiction as distinguishable from the original State
of Washington

in Bozarth,

supra, which

was

bringing

the

proceeding in the State of Oregon where the obligor resides.
Additionally, the State of Oregon has a statute, to-wit:
ORS 110.176 which provides that ORS 107.431 in modification
proceedings changes the common law rules of support obligations

and

visitation

rights

as

independent.

Under

the

Oregon statute ORS 110.176, ORS 107.431 shall not apply to a
proceeding

under URESA when the child

to whom

a duty of

support is owed is in another state which has enacted the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, and a Court in that

-1 ?-

state would have subject matter and personal

jurisdiction

under that Act to determine custody and visitation rights.
Therefore another distinguishable fact between the immediate
case and

the Bozarth

case

is that Utah does not have a

statute at all similar to ORS 107.431 or ORS 110.176.
In

the

case

of

State

of

Oregon,

ex

rel. State

of

Alaska, Child Support Division, ex rel. Lacey v. Hargrove,
747 P.2d

366

(Or. App. 1987), the Oregon Court relied on

Bozarth,

supra, and

25.240, wherein

another

the Oregon

Oregon

statute, to-wit: ORS

legislation

clearly

indicated

that parents may not use legal custody as a shield to deny
support

obligations

under

ORS

Chapter...

110

or

URESA.

Again, that case is distinguishable from the irjuediate case
at hand in that rhere is not in the State of Utah any of the
three statutes referred to in the two Oregon cases, and as
cited earlier, this State Court or the Trial Court does have
continuing

jurisdiction

to

determine

matters

raised

by

either of the parties in regards support and visitation.
In

the Wisconsin

Hubbard, 329 N.K.2d

case

202

of

State

(Wis. 1983),

ex

rel. Hubbard

cited

v.

by Appellant,

facts are distinguishable from the immediate case at hand.
The State of California has both subject matter jurisdiction
and

personal

jurisdiction

over

the

two

parties

having

entered the original Decree of Divorce and having entered an
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order of support.

The support order was under URESA trans-

ferred to the State of Wisconsin where the obligee resided
and

the Wisconsin

Court determined

that

it did

not have

jurisdiction under URESA or an interstate enforcement of a
support obligation to consider matters of custody, visitation or custodial parents contempt because the responding
Court's

consideration

of

those

issues

efficiency of the URESA mechanism.

would

burden

the

Again, as distinguished

from the immediate case at hand, the Wisconsin Court had not
entered

the

original

Decree

of

Divorce

and

specifically

indicated that California, the initiating state, h ad oricri —
nal subject matter

jurisdiction

and personal

jurisdiction

over the parties to consider these issues.
In the case of Vigil v. Vigil, 494 P.2d 609 (Colo. App.
1972), the facts are again distinguishable from this immediate case in that the parties never availed themselves of a
divorce action in either the responding
where the obligor resided nor

in the initiating

California where the obligee resided.
been
State

divorced,
of

the

Colorado

custodial
with

state of Colorado

parent

the

state of

The parties had not
had

children

simply
to

the

left

the

State

of

California and thereafter initiated a URESA action to obtain
an Order for the support of the children.

Neither a divorce

nor custody nor visitation nor support were ever addressed
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in either one of the states and there was no continuing
jurisdiction in the State of Colorado or California as there
is in the State of Utah in the immediate case at hand.
In

the

Colorado

Supreme

Court

case

of

County

of

Clearwater v. Petrash, 598 P.2d 138 (Colo. 1979) (En Banc),
although the parties were divorced in the State of Colorado
and it was the responding State as in the immediate case at
hand,

the

State

of

Colorado

has

a

specific

and

direct

statute on point in its URESA statute found at § 14-5-124,
C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Supp.) which provides in part that:
...The determination or enforcement
of a duty of support owed to one obligee
shall be unaffected by any interference
by
another
obligee with
rights
of
custody or visitation granted by a
court.
The State of Utah does not have a similar statute directly
on point, and in fact it does have a statute cited earlier
indicating that this Court would have continuing jurisdiction under the immediate facts where the Decree was granted
in the State of Utah allowing for specific visitation rights
and not granting child support.
The Appellant then cites this Honorable Court to the
Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-31-38, 77-31-31 and 77-31-9.

In

contrast to those statutes, the Respondent five or six years
prior

to

any

action

taken

through

a URESA

petition

had

already established subject matter jurisdiction and personal
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jurisdiction over the Appellant and the Respondent through a
divorce action that was filed and properly
State of Utah.

served

in the

Jurisdiction does exist for that reason and

continues pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5 for this
Court, in particular

the Weber

County District Court, to

reconsider those issues originally brought in the Complaint
for divorce and which were entered in the Divorce Decree by
this Court as a direct, if not an ancillary proceeding to
the URESA petition which more than simply coincidentally was
brought in the same exact action with the same exact civil
number, rather than as an independent action.
The Pifer v. Pifer, 229 S.E.2d 700

(N.C. 1976) case

again involves parties that were divorced in the State of
Florida, the obligor moved to another state, North Carolina,
and

subsequent

thereto

the obligee

support in Florida under a URESA

filed

a petition

for

action which was trans-

ferred to North Carolina and the North Carolina Court found
that

there was

no

jurisdiction

over

therefore, the judgment was void.

the

subject matter,

Again, those facts are

distinguishable from the immediate case ar hand as indicated
earlier.

In this case the obligor has remained in the State

where the divorce was entered, there is continuing jurisdiction, both subject matter and personal, over the obligee,
which is distinguishable from North Carolina attempting to

exercise subject matter and/or personal jurisdiction over an
obligee who has simply initiated a URESA petition in that
state where the original divorce was in her resident state
of Florida.
The

case

of Hoover v. Hoover, 246

S.E.2d

179

(S.C.

1978) cites to Pifer, supra, in holding that a Court of a
responding state has no jurisdiction to adjudicate matters
of visitation.

But

a careful review of

that case would

again indicate that it is distinguishable

from this case.

In Hoover, no divorce action was ever initiated in either
the initiating or responding state, but instead Mrs. Hoover
initiated an action in Michigan, the initiating state under
the URESA provisions for support of herself and of the two
children, which action was transferred to South Carolina as
a responding state.

South Carolina refused to exercise and

recognize jurisdiction for the adjudication of child custody
or visitation privileges.

Again, no action was ever initi-

ated in South Carolina by either of the parties other than
through the URESA, whereas in the immediate case the divorce
was initiated and concluded in Utah and there is continuing
jurisdiction over those matters.
In Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602 (Utah 9152), it simply
stands

for

the

premises

that

if

a

judgment

is

entered

without jurisdiction the Order is void on its base for lack
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of jurisdiction.
tion is indeed

That is not the issue here.

If jurisdic-

lacking, then any judgment entered without

jurisdiction would be void but the Respondent's argument is
that

there

is

continuing

jurisdiction

and

personal

and

subject matter jurisdiction to enter an Order in regards to
visitation

and

support

independent

and

ancillary

of

the

URESA action.
In Fitzwater v. Fitzwater, 294 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. 1980),
the Court of Appeals specifically held that "[T]he Act does
not,

of

course,

grant

in

personam

jurisdiction

over

a

non-resident party not otherwise subject to the power of the
Michigan

Courts."

Again

in this

case, the

parties

were

already subject both in personam and under subject matter to
the jurisdiction of the State of Utah distinguishing this
case •
In Thompson
state

of

divorce

v. Kite, 522
and where

P.2d

all

327

(Kan. 1974),

the

parties

resided with

the

exception of the ex-husband, was Missouri, which was also
the initiating state.

responding
refused

state

The State of Kansas, which was the

and which is

where

the

obligor

resided,

to submit the obligee to the jurisdiction of the

responding Court in other independent proceedings involving
collateral

matters.

Again,

this

case

is

distinguishable

because no divorce proceedings were ever initiated

in the

responding State of Kansas, all action was taken other than
the URESA action in the State of Missouri.
Accordingly, with a review of every single case cited
by the Appellant, the District Court of Weber County, State
of Utah, based on the authority cited by Respondent, maintains continuing jurisdiction both in personam and subject
matter over the parties concerning all issues including not
only child

support, but visitation, be they ancillary

or

directly dependent matters in relation to the URESA action
seeking child support.
judicial

economy

with

If for no other reason than that of
the

fact

that

there

is

continuing

jurisdiction in the State of Utah over these matters, the
Weber County District Court for the State of Utah did have
jurisdiction and the Court did not err in exercising jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate an issue involving visitation
as either an ancillary dependent or independent cause of
action pursuant to a URESA petition in the same exact civil
action.

The Order of the District Court Judge should be

affirmed.
POINT III.
A CONTINUOUS PAYMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT AS
AN OBLIGATION CAN BE MADE CONTINGENT
UPON THE FREE EXERCISE OF VISITATION.
The Appellant is not seeking child support arrearage,
which

Respondent

believes

she
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would

not

be

entitled

to

anyways under Larsen v. Larsen, 561 P.2d 1077
wherein

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

held

that

(Utah 1977),
"alimony

and

support payments become unalterable debts as they accrue and
therefore a periodic installment cannot be changed or modified

after

the

installments

have

become

due".

In

the

immediate case the Trial Court specifically found that there
was to be no payment of child support until further order of
the Court.
In regards to an adjudication as to issues of visitation and child support and their inter-relation, while it is
true that the Utah Code Annotated

§ 78-45-3

states

that

"every man shall support his child;...11, and that Hills v.
Hills, 638 P.2d 516

(Utah 1981), and the other cases cited

by the Appellant would indicate that the "right to support
from the parents belongs to the minor children and is not
subject to being bartered away, extinguished, stopped or in
any way

defeated

parents.11
Peterson,
parent

by the agreement or the conduct of the

The Utah Supreme Court did find in Peterson v.
530

seeking

P.2d

821

payment

(Utah
of

1974),

child

that

support

the

after

custodial
the

Court in that case had entered the following Order:

Trial
"The

payment of child support is suspended until such time as the
Plaintiff appears in person... and purges herself of contempt."

was not entitled

to Court action.

In Peterson,

some

nine

and

a half

years

prior

to the bringing

of

a

petition to modify to award child support to the custodial
parent, the non-custodial parent brought an Order to Show
Cause why the custodial parent should not be held in contempt

for

failure

provision and

to

comply

with

the Order cited

the

visitation

rights

to above was entered

as a

result thereof.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

in Peterson

further

held

as

follows:
There is no question but that Mrs. P was
in contempt of court, after having been
in such straits for 9h years, when she
applied for the support money judgment,
without have purged herself of the
contempt.
That
requirement
was
a
condition precedent to obtaining the
support money, i.e., -the exercise of
Mr. P f s right to see his children. Mrs.
P had not permitted this, which became
the basis for her contempt. In short,
she had not done and is not doing equity
the while she insists on it, by now
seeking,
without
any
displayed
penitence, remcrse or strings attached,
to invoke the very jurisdiction of the
same court that she flouted before. She
was in no conscionable position to do so
and the court need not have entertained
her petition.
To coin a paraphrased
maxim of equity and reduce it to pigeon
English, "One ray not make a monkey out
of the Court," - without cause, that is.
In the immediate case at hand, although admittedly an
Order to Show Cause for contempt has not been brought, the
Trial Court had ordered in the original Decree of Divorce
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six years earlier, that child support be held in abeyance
until further order of the Court while
ordering

custody

in

the

Appellant

at the same time

subject

to

reasonable

visitation by the Respondent.
In both
that

the

of

the

transcripts, testimony was

Respondent

has

never

seen

the

proffered

children

since

February of 1983, and accordingly the Trial Court in affirming the recommendation of the Commissioner

did order

the

payment of child support at the rate of $76.00 per month per
child and did also conditionally order that that money be
held

in

abeyance

and

not

disbursed

until

such

time

as

visitation under the Utah Court Order originally entered six
years

previous

constitute
Appellant.

was

complied

with.

This

in

effect would

a contempt which has yet to be purged by the
The

Appellant

is

attempting

to

exercise

in

equity the jurisdiction of this Court through a URESA action
which is somewhat misleading in that even though the initiating state was the State of California, the actual support
order being enforced is a support order established in the
State of Utah modifying an original Utah Decree of Divorce.
The Appellant has come into the Court with "unclean hands".
In the Utah Supreme Court case of Johnson v. Johnson,
560 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1977), an ex-spouse brought an Order to
Show Cause and contempt citation against the former husband
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on a claim of willful disobedience ot tne Divorce Decree as
it pertained to payment of debts and obligations, utilities
and attorneyfs fees.

The Supreme Court in that case chose

not to believe the former wife's testimony

that she knew

nothing about damage to a truck and camper allegedly in her
possession and concluded that she was without "clean hands",
and thus not in a position to seek equity, resulting in the
dismissal of the Order to Show Cause and contempt citation•
The Court held as follows:
As general rule , party in contempt
will not be heard by court when he
wishes to make a motion or grant a
favor.
In this case, after a review of the
evidence, the Court chose not to believe
Appellantfs testimony that she knew
nothing about the damage to the truck
and camper and concluded she was without
"clean hands" and hence not in a position to seek equity and the Court was
well within the bounds of discretion in
dismissing the Order to Show Cause and
contempt citation.
Neither of the cases cited by the Respondent have been
overturned
eration

in

or modified
light

of

and

should

be

the Appellant's

taken

into

constant

consid-

refusal

to

grant the Respondent visitation.
As a further

issue as to whether

or not this Court

should simply recognize the Petitioner's request for child
support while

ignoring

other

issues, the applicable

Utah

URESA statute
seq.

found at Utah Code Annotated

in particular

UCA

§ 77-31-11

§ 77-31-1 et.

entitled

"Contents

of

Petition for Support11, states as follows:
The petition shall be verified and
shall state the name and, so far as
known to the petitioner, the address and
circumstances of the respondent and his
dependents for whom support is sought,
and all other pertinent information.
Neither
responding

the

initiating

State

of

Utah

State

has

of

stated

California
the

dependents for whom support is sought

address

nor

the

of

the

so that a question

arises as to the actual validity of the URESA petition.

It

has been a practice of the Department of Social Services and
in particular

the

Office

of

Recovery

Services

under

the

Attorney General, to interpret § 11 of the Utah URESA to
require

the

original

petition

to

state

the

address

and

circumstances of the Respondent and his dependents for whom
support is sought and to require that the obligee provide
and update the address for the children.
address

If the current

is not provided, then the agency feels the Court

should hold the

forwarding

of any child

support payments

made by the obligor until the address is provided.
Accordingly,
Respondent

and

based

the

upon

policy

of

the
the

case

authority

Department

of

of

the

Social

Services, the Office of Recovery Services, the Commissioner
as affirmed by the Trial Court is fully within legal rights

to

condition

allowance

of

the

payment

to

the

Respondent

the
to

State

agency

exercise

his

upon

the

visitation

rights as established by the Trial Court six years previous
and which

have

been

and

are

still

being

denied

to

the

present date.
CONCLUSION
The

District

Court

of

the

State

of

Utah

in Weber

County, had from 1983 to the present, both in personam and
subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and continuing
jurisdiction under Utah statutes, and particularly in light
of the URESA petition being filed as part of the original
1983 divorce action to intermingle

the

issue of on-going

child support and visitation and consider both simultaneously or one as an ancillary but considerable cause of action.
With

the

in personam

and

subject matter

jurisdiction

to

consider those issues, the Commissioner as affirmed by the
Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in the allowing an
order of child support at the rate of $76.00 per month per
child as in essence a modification of the original Decree of
Divorce which allowed no support until further order of the
Court.

It was not an abuse of discretion to condition the

release of those monies from the custody of the Court upon
the allowance by the Appellant of visitation as ordered by

-?fi-

the Trial Court more than six years ago and which has never
been allowed.
WHEREFORE, the final Order of the Trial Court should
not be reversed but should be affirmed and costs awarded.
DATED this

) / d a y of September, 198 9.

PETTTN. VLAffOS
Attorney for
Plaintiff/Respondent

X

0 <L '6 b » J

moAti

MAX D. LAMPH
Attorney for Plaintiff
2564 Washington Blvd. #1
Ogden, Utah
84401
Telephone: 399-5885
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

.
*V

V

STATE OF UTAH

LAURIAN P . CHARLESWORTH,

]

Plaintiff,

]1

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,

]
Civil No.

84525

Defendant.

rnis action came on regularly for hearing on the 1st day
of August, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge
of the abov£-entitled Court; MAX D. LAMPH appearing as counsel
for Plaintiff and Plaintiff appearing in person, and Defendant
having been duly served with process and her default for failure
to answer or otherwise plead 10 Plaintiff's Complaint within
time allowed by law, and the Court having hearing thp evidence
introduced by Plaintiff, and the matter being submitted to the
Court for its decision, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises now makes and enters it:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That Plaintiff now is and for more than three months

next prior to the commencement of this action has been an actual

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth
Civil No84525

2.

Page 2

That Plaintiff and Defendant were married to each other

in Los Angeles, California, on April 14, 1979, and ever since
have been and now are husband and wife.
3.

That three children have probably been born as issue of

this marriage, to-wit:

JOSEPH, born February 3, 1980, and

PATRICK, born January 7, 1982, and possibly a third child born
in March 1983.
4.

That Defendant has been guilty of cruel treatment of

the Plaintiff to the extent of causing him great mental distress
in rhat Defendant was never satisfied with Plaintiff's employment
and Defer/Jont frequ*Mt.Iy absentized herself from the home ci the
parties and returned to live with her folks, and Defendant informed
Plaintiff that she was no longer in love with him.
5.

That the Plaintiff has been employed at Westland Ford

since July 1982, and has an average gross earnings of approximately
$750.00 per month.
From the foregoing facts, the Court now makes and enters
its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That a Decree of Divorce should be entered in favor of

Plaintiff and against Defendant, provided, that the Decree should
not become final until November 1, 1983.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth
Civil No.
84525

2.

Page 3

That the Plaintiff should be awarded the personal

property now in his possession.
3o

That the minor children of the parties should be

awarded to the Defendant, subject to reasonable visitation
by the Plaintiff.
4.

That child support should be held in abeyance until

further order of the Court.
DATED this

xZ, day of August, 1983.

rDOUGLASZL CORNABY
District Judge

n '^ 8

Recorded Book

Page

£££

v.;

o

Indexed
st'c-

MAX D. LAMPH
Attorney for Plaintiff
2564 Washington Blvd. #1
Ogden, Utah
84401
Telephone: 399-5885
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF

LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiff,
vs.
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,
Civil No.

84525

Defendant.

This action came on regularly for hearing on the 1st day
of August, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, Judge
of the above-entitled Court; MAX D. LAMPH appearing as counsel
for Plaintiff and Plaintiff appearing in person, and Defendant
having been duly served with process and her default for failure
to answer or otherwise plead to Plaintiff's Complaint within
time allowed by law, and the Court having hearing the evidence
introduced by Plaintiff, and the matter being submitted to the
Court for its decision, and the Court being fully advised in the
premises and having heretofore made and entered its Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in writing, NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a Decre^of
Divorce be and the same is hereby entered in favor of PlaintJ

Recorded Boo\dL/H7.
Page . . . .
Indexed .

•17S
Page 2

Decree of Divorce
Charlesworth vs. Charlesworth
Civil No.
84525

and against Defendant, and that this Decree shall become final
on November 1, 19 83.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff be and hereby is
awarded the personal property now in his possession.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant be and hereby is
awarded the care, custody and control of the minor children
of the parties, subject to reasonable visitation by the Plaintiff,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED thct child support be held in abeyance
until further order of the Court.
DATED this

,^

day of August, 1983.

/

/

/

/

~*y~~- j -

DOUGEftS-JZ CORNABY
District" Judge

.zr:

•OC

24

DAVID L . WILKINSON # 3 4 7 2
Attorney General
MICHAEL D. SMITH #3 008
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, C i v i l Enforcement Division
RICHARD J . CULBERTSON #40 21
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
2540 W a s h i n g t o n B l v d . , 4 t h F l o o r
Ogden, Utah
84401
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 6 2 6 - 3 5 1 2

JUL 5 2 c ^ P H ! 8 S
i.
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAURIAN P . CHARLESWORTH,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
vs.

:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA AND
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,

:
:

Defendant.

. P E T I T I O N FOR SUPPORT
(URESA C a s e )

Civil No. 845 25

:

COMES NOW t h e above-named d e f e n d a n t ,
Attorney General!s Office,
as

by and t h r o u g h

who c o m p l a i n s of p l a i n t i f f

and

the

alleges

follows:
1.

T h i s i s a p r o c e e d i n g b r o u g h t u n d e r t h e Uniform

Reciprocal Enforcement
Annotated,

1 9 5 3 , as
2.

California,
C l e r k of
Court,

of S u p p o r t A c t ,

Utah Code

amended.

T h a t s a i d a c t i o n was i n i t i a t e d
w n i c h i s one of t h e S t a t e s

t h i s Court received

w i t h t h e S t a t e of

adopting

from t h e C l e r k

of t h e S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a ,

Angeles,

77-31-1,

of

in and f o r

said Act.
the

The

Superior

t h e County of Los

t h e a t t a c h e d d o c u m e n t s , which a r e by r e f e r e n c e made a

p a r t of t h i s

Petition.

9

PETITION FOR SUPPORT
Page 2

3.

That

URESA P e t i t i o n ,
provides,

included

Certificate

in p a r t ,

Court,
5.

Attorney

Utah,
and

That

General

proceedings
responding

for

subject

for

charged

with

of

following:
Certificate

s u p p o r t for

the

child(ren).
at

2054 O r c h a r d

is the duly

District,

of

of

of

State

Avenue,

the

said

assigned

the responsibility

t h e Second J u d i c i a l

aboveAct.

Assistant

said
of U t a h ,

the

State.

defendant

should

prays

the Court

to appear

and r e q u i r e d

f o r and a s t h e s u p p o r t

other

said

to the provisions

the undersigned

n o t be o r d e r e d

judgment

the

and w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n

is

Show C a u s e r e q u i r i n g

month

That

is domiciled

WHEREFORE, d e f e n d a n t

should

are

owes a d u t y

h i s minor

That p l a i n t i f f

i n Weber C o u n t y ,
entitled

of

papers

and O r d e r .

t h a t defendant

s u p p o r t and m a i n t e n a n c e
4.

in s a i d

i t s Order

for child

to

a n d show c a u s e why h e

t o pay a r e a s o n a b l e

of h i s m i n o r

n o t be awarded

issue

sum e a c h

c h i l d ( r e n ) , why
support

in a r r e a r s ,

and

relief.
DATED t h i s

^

d a y of J u n e , 1 9 8 8 .
DAVID L . WILKINSON
Attorney/General

J . CUWERTSON
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
Attorney for P l a i n t i f f
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< 2p ,

PETE N. VLAHOS, ?3337
VLAHOS, SHARP, WIGHT & WALPOLE
Attorney for Plaintiff
Legal Forum Building
2447 Kiesel Avenue
Ogden, Utah 8 4401
Telephone: (801) 621-2464
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
LAURIAN P. CHARLESWORTH,
RECOMMENDED ORDER ON
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF CALIFORMA and
BTANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,

CIVIL MO: 84525

Defendants.
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the
18th

day

of October,

Richards,
sitting

Commissioner

without

Non-Support

a

1988, before
of

]ury,

the
on

the

Domestic
the

Honorable
Relations

Defendants

Maurice
Court,

Reciprocal

action, and the Plaintiff appearing in person

and with his attorney, Pete N. Vlahos, and the Defendant,
Blanca H. Charlesworth, not appearing in person and Attorney
Carl

Perry

appearing

in

behalf

of

the

Defendants,

and

argument having been made to the Court by both attorneys,
and

the

Court

being

RECOMMFNDFn OPnFP ON

fully

cognizant

of

all

matters

u

Charlesworth vs. State of California, et al.
Civil No: 84525

pertaining therein, enters the following Recommended Order
on Order to Show Cause and is set forth as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is not granted any judgment for any

arrearages in the above matter.
2.

That

commencing

November,

1988,

the

Plaintiff

shall pay to the Defendant the sum of $76.00 per month per
child as and for support for three (3) minor children, said
payments shall be made to the Weber County Clerk's Office in
two equal installments, one-half on the 5th and one-half on
the 20th.
3.
to

hold

That -he Weber County Clerk's Office is directed
said

funds

until

the

Defendant,

Blanca

H.

Charlesworth, allows the Plaintiff visitation with the minor
children.
4.

That the Court at this time concludes reasonable

visitation to be four (4) weeks in the summer, plus Christmas Day at noon and for four

(4) days thereafter, provided

however, the Plaintiff shall pay the costs of transportation
to and from the Defendant's residence.

Charlesworth vs. State of California, ^t'al^'
3LERK
;
Civil No: 84525
\T
'
-

c
support

mu^+.
sha • 1

^nr.^v,^.

'-.<•• nbahc-':

abate-.'DATED

o-u^

-oral.

. •ch is

JJJ_

pumir.ri^

^n sitation
That

there

the

chi ] d

will

be

no

- • . a-^ct >.

cay el Or^fensr", 1988.
•

'

/

[.E MAbBttOE RICHARDS
Commissioner, Domestic
Relations Court

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

,<M
AJer€QJ9jj&y f o r

Defendants

O R D E R

Show C a u s e

signed

a n d a p p r o v e d by t h e

/ _ y _ d a y ofc^efeeheE-,

District:

Co 1 :.

1988.
BY THE

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE/"/

U

DAVID L. WIJL.JMJ\^ .
2
Attorney Genera I
MICHAEL D. SMITH *? -.('••'•.
Assistant Attorney General
Division Chief, Civ?1 F^* •* ::eiiion t;
KARL G. PERRY #2570
Assistant Attorney Genera.
2540 Washington B l ™ 1
^ ;. l.lj I""! o o r
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IN THE SECOND

f
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* C( nih"|' ! H« VIKHF'R COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

LAURT A! I I' CHAR I .ESWDRTH,
Plaint ill.,

CON TO RECOMMENDED
ORDER

vs .

STATE OF CALIFORNIA and
BLANCA H. CHARLESWORTH,
Civil No:

8 4525

Defendant.
COMES NOW, Kai
n::d

Perry, coun^.-l MJI : he State of Utah

the defendant State n-F ^^lif-^-nin m - b u a n u lo
' pr--"-

^'":

,,-;:...

p a r a g r a p h J ana 4 of

the proposed Recommended Order of Maurice Richards on the hearing
dated October 1«

i "Rfc
jourt

• ~ -< J- .
.^..^;a juij.sdicL:ori i:u address any other

issues other than child support since this is a UREFA ^ , H ' o n
UCA 77-31-31, 1951 a

-^-.. -Vd.

CISL

law

...;

^nciions

demonstrates that the Utah statute comports with rhe majority
position on the limited jurisdiction involved
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proceedings.
App. 1978);

See Patterson v. Patterson,

581 P.2d 824 (Kan.

See also Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (Kan. App.

1974); and State ex rel., State of Washington v. Bozarth, 722
P2d. 48 (Ore. App. 1986).
Although these precedents from other jurisdictions are
not controlling authority over this court, the Utah URESA
provisions express clear legislative intent for courts to
interpret the Utah provisions in accordance with interpretations
given to URESA provisions from other jurisdictions.

The act

states in UCA 77-31-38 1953 as amended as follows:

"this act

shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate it's
general purpose to make uniform the law of those states whicn
enact it".

Therefore, it is respectfully requested that those

provisions of the Recommended Order dealing with child visitation
be stricken and the rest of the Order be allowed to remain.
DATED this

day of November, 1988.
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Avenue, Ogden, Utah

84401 on m e

/

J

-

Secretary

*•' •••;<>.

- 1

£ 1.1
ndc-x-Ki

^C
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Legal Forum Building
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Civil No.:

an exhibit

l

84525

-CCT^ ^t y

concerning

his attempt

to contact the Defendant,

Blanca H. Char 1esworth, for visitation, and the Court being
fully

cognizant

the following

of

matters

pertaining

therein,

enters

Order:

IT IS HEREBY
1.

all

That

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

all

payments

of

support

being

made

by

the

Plaintiff shall remain with the Clerk of the Court and shall
be held
tiff

by the Clerk of the Court until

such time as Plain-

is able to contact the Defendant and work out visita-

tion with the three (3) minor children.
DATED this

/H

day of

UJ
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(DO

TA

District Court
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Attorney for Defendants

ORDER ON OBJECTION HEARING

2

rnia,_ : et ail^,

Char leswor L*: VL;
C i v i l N o : 84525

nn 10 i s

> 0 r : tin',!

5.
support

Tl is t

during

s h a 11 b e aba t e d

til ie

summer

:LLHK

vi si tati on

iii to ta ]

the

chi 3 d

T I: i a I : 1:1 ie i e w :i ] ] 1 : = • i i :
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